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Abstract 
This study investigates the financial effects of additions to and deletions from the most well-
known social stock index: the MSCI KLD 400. Our study makes use of the unique setting that 
index reconstitution provides and allows us to bypass possible issues of endogeneity that 
commonly plague empirical studies of the link between corporate social and financial 
performance. By examining not only short-term returns but also trading activity, earnings per 
share and long-term performance of stocks that are involved in these events, we bring forward 
evidence of a ‘social index effect’ where unethical transgressions are penalized more heavily than 
responsibility is rewarded. We find that the addition of a stock to the index does not lead to 
material changes in its market price, whereas deletions are accompanied by negative cumulative 
abnormal returns. Trading volumes for deleted stocks are significantly increased on the event 
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date, while the operational performance of the respective firms deteriorates after their deletion 
from the social index. 
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Abbreviations 
AAR Average abnormal return 
CAAR Cumulative average abnormal return 
CFP Corporate financial performance 
CSP Corporate social performance 
CSR Corporate social responsibility 
ETF Exchange traded fund 
ESG Environmental, social, governmental 
SRI Socially responsible investment 
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Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate social performance (CSP), sustainable business 
and corporate citizenship have become important concepts that have attracted the interest of 
academics, practitioners and policymakers alike. A very diverse set of issues revolving around CSR 
has been investigated, ranging from the role of innovation on the link between corporate strategy 
and social issues (Pavelin and Porter, 2008) and the relationship between CSR and political beliefs 
(Rubin, 2008) to the necessary contingencies required for building a strong reputation through 
CSR (Hillenbrand et al., 2012) and even the linkages of CSR with corruption in the case of 
multinational enterprises (Rodriguez et al., 2006). The theme that has been most extensively 
examined within this area has been the empirical relationship between CSP and corporate financial 
performance (CFP). Both qualitative overviews of the literature (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; 
Renneboog et al., 2008) and statistical meta-analyses (Orlitzky et al., 2003) are indicative of the 
methodological breadth and diversity of existing studies. They also indicate that no clear consensus 
with regard to the sign, size and strength between the two concepts has been established (Griffin 
and Mahon, 1997; Margolis et al., 2009) and stress the need to explore finer-grained characteristics 
of the CSP–CFP link. 
It is in this area that the current study aims to fill some of the existing knowledge gaps, by 
concentrating on the effects of additions to and deletions from social stock indices. Overall, the 
fact that we look into short-term and long-term abnormal returns, trading volumes and earnings 
per share changes connected to social index recompositions, allows us to enrich the literature. 
Specifically, we show that there is a ‘gold social seal’ that cannot be explained by traditional views 
concerning the index effect, but that is in line with predictions coming from the CSR literature. 
Interestingly, we find that deletions from the MSCI KLD social index are connected with 
significant negative short-run and long-run returns and increases in trading volumes, whereas there 
is no analogous result for additions to the index. We anticipate that our findings are of considerable 
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interest to firm managers, who are trying to create the optimal mix of corporate social frameworks, 
programs and practices for their firms. The main lesson to be learned is that building strong 
strategic relationships with key stakeholder groups can backfire, if the firm does not intend to 
sustain these relationships over time. In addition, corporate executives will be interested to know 
that the impact of socially beneficial firm policies may be more than outweighed (in terms of 
financial impact) by indications of corporate social concerns and involvement with controversial 
industries. Lastly, our research is of relevance to the managers of socially responsible investment 
(SRI) 1 tracker funds who are desirous of knowing the optimal time to buy newly included stocks 
and sell newly deleted stocks in order to trade off tracking error (which is usually minimized by 
transacting immediately before the composition change) and adverse price movements (which are 
usually minimized by trading immediately upon announcement). 
We argue that the setting of these market-related, highly visible events offers considerable 
advantages over alternative ways to capture the association between CSP and CFP, especially in 
regards to two problematic issues the literature commonly faces: 
(1) The conceptual and empirical distinction between positive and negative CSP indicators 
(and their respective financial impacts) 
(2) The clear separation between CSP and its financial repercussions (i.e. endogeneity between 
the operationalization of the two concepts) 
We elaborate on each of these issues, and how the paper addresses them, in turn. A number of 
studies have argued that the link between social/environmental and financial performance can be 
very different across social issues, according to the nature of the issues themselves, the related 
initiatives and the stakeholder groups with which they are connected (Gilley et al., 2000; Hillman 
and Keim, 2001; Pava and Krausz, 1996; Rowley and Berman, 2000). Most notably, a stylized 
observation that has surfaced in the literature has to do with the differences in the financial impacts 
of CSR versus those of social irresponsibility. Mattingly and Berman (2006) have argued and 
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demonstrated that a firm’s social strengths and its track-record of its respective social controversies 
are issues that are both conceptually and empirically distinct, should not be combined for research 
purposes and are likely to generate different economic outcomes. Lankoski (2009) administers a 
survey addressed to senior executives, which is demonstrative of their view that the damaging 
financial effects of social actions producing negative externalities are stronger than the value-
enhancing outcomes of positive social corporate initiatives. In a similar vein, Folkes and Kamins 
(1999) find that unethical behaviour in hiring practices had a more significant impact on consumer 
perceptions than did pro-social activity in employee relations. Mishra and Modi (2013) find that 
both social responsibility and social irresponsibility are connected with idiosyncratic firm risk (in a 
negative and positive manner respectively) but that the effects of positive CSP are not guaranteed 
and are contingent on firm leverage. 
All the aforementioned evidence suggests that indications of negative CSP have more powerful 
financial impacts compared to positive CSP. The setting of this study is such that it provides a 
natural laboratory for effectively focusing on the distinctive (and potentially asymmetric) financial 
impacts of positive versus negative CSP and avoid the hazards of endogeneity between CSP and 
CFP. Given that inclusions of firms to social indices are connected to significant relative 
improvements of their socially responsible practises and deletions from such indices are related to 
a deterioration of the firms’ socio-environmental status, studying financial returns around these 
events is an alternative but very intuitive way to examine the differences in the economic impacts 
of social responsibility and irresponsibility. The neat separation between the two can be 
instrumental in guiding the decision making process of firm executives that want to implement a 
corporate strategy leading to effective stakeholder management (through CSR) and portfolio 
managers seeking to generate positive alphas and reduce significant exposures to idiosyncratic risks 
(connected to corporate social irresponsibility). 
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Another issue in the CSP–CFP literature that has received more attention in the last few years has 
to do with the potential endogeneity characterizing this link. Waddock and Graves (1997) were 
amongst the first to note that there may be a ‘virtuous cycle’ characterizing the relationship 
between the two concepts, whereby higher CSP generates improved financial performance, and 
improved financial performances boosts higher investment towards socially responsible practices, 
leading to a simultaneous determination of the size of both. Nelling and Webb (2009), under the 
same rationale, show that the CSP–CFP link weakens significantly when using appropriate 
econometric techniques that account for endogeneity. Chang et al. (2013), on the other hand, use 
regressions with lagged explanatory variables and an instrumental variables approach to bypass 
endogeneity issues and show that the connection of CSP with firm financial performance and risk 
survives these considerations. 
We posit that examining market reactions to social index recompositions provides a pathway which 
helps this study escape (or at least alleviate) the concern of endogeneity between social and 
financial variables that the CSP–CFP literature commonly faces. The very particular sequence that 
is followed in this type of event (with changes in CSP clearly preceding the index reconstitution 
and the stock price reactions following the event) provides a unique opportunity to look into a 
phenomenon that can only be unidirectional (with causality running from CSP to CFP). This is in 
contrast to, for example, linking social ratings or reputational indices with financial performance 
because the dynamic evolution of the former can be hard to disentangle from the simultaneous 
development of the latter (thus making it hard to establish cause and effect). 
In summary, this study focuses on one aspect of the CSP–CFP relationship which has not been 
studied in depth within the relevant literature, despite the fact that it has a direct association with 
the market’s reaction to CSP information and is highly relevant to investor perceptions of CSP 
itself: the ‘social index effect’. This is the price response that the announcement of an addition to 
or deletion from an SRI equity index causes to the underlying stock. Investigating these 
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phenomena provides a unique opportunity for unveiling some of the finer characteristics of the 
relationship between CSP and CFP. By examining inclusions to and removals from SRI stock 
indices, which are highly visible public events, we can zoom in on the magnitude of the market 
impact of third-party endorsements of firms’ social performance.  
Related literature and candidate frameworks 
Social indices and reconstitution effects 
Interest in research of the link between CSP and CFP has increased in parallel with financial 
markets’ awareness of CSP, as a potentially important factor that can influence risk-adjusted 
returns of financial assets. Thus, SRI has also become more widespread. This is reflected in the 
constantly increasing number of SRI funds and the total assets under management which, in the 
US, have grown from 55 and $12 billion (in 1995) to 493 and $569 billion (in 2010) respectively, 
in a matter of 15 years. Equally impressive is the fact that, although the number of funds in the 
hands of professional asset managers significantly decreased during the period of the most recent 
financial crisis (2007–2010), the funds related to SRI have remained flat − thus the market share 
of SRI effectively increased. 2 
The rapid development of socially responsible investing into a significant and widely applied 
investment approach over the past two decades has motivated the construction of a great range of 
social indices3 (comprised of socially responsible stocks) and of social tracker funds4 that aim to 
replicate the performance of these indices. The performance characteristics and composition of 
socially responsible indices has been studied and compared to ‘conventional’ equity indices 
(Schröder, 2007; Statman, 2006), the general consensus being that, on average, the two sets of 
indices have similar risk-return characteristics and highly correlated return patterns which, at times, 
also exhibit substantial dispersion. 
Yet, the studies examining whether a socially responsible index effect exists are limited in both 
number and scope. Although the literature on the index effect relating to mainstream indices is 
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large, it is not clear whether the key findings therein also apply to socially responsible indices, 
which are typically both smaller in terms of assets following them and more specialized. It is 
perhaps also the case that investors may be more challenged in anticipating the future composition 
of social indices. This is expected because of the additional criteria that the firm must meet in order 
to be deemed socially responsible and enter the index, on top of meeting the other conditions of 
listing (based usually on firm size and representativeness of the sector in which the firm operates). 
Until recently, corporate reports on social responsibility and sustainability were a rarity for the 
majority of firms and there were no clear guidelines to help structure such reports and ensure the 
relevance and quality of the information included in them. In addition, companies may selectively 
provide CSP-related information for self-serving reasons in what has been termed “impression 
management” (Margolis and Walsh, 2003) making CSP assessment more problematic. Even if the 
information is reliable, the effort to assess firm social performance may be demanding if most of 
the available data are qualitative in nature and thus harder to operationalize (Lackmann et al., 2012). 
The creation of quantitative CSP ratings and scores by specialized agencies has lessened these 
concerns, but has posed different challenges. For example, in the case of the KLD STATS database 
(now owned by MSCI and used as part of the screening required for participation to the MSCI 
KLD 400), there are two main considerations: 
(1) The produced CSP ratings are only available to dedicated subscribers and are not widely 
accessible by market participants, so not every investor can use them to predict index 
recompositions. 
(2) KLD data cover multiple CSP dimensions (community relations, environmental issues, 
employee health and safety, diversity, human rights, corporate governance, involvement 
with controversial industries, etc.) and assess social strengths and concerns separately. 
Thus, it is not straightforward to construct a single numeric measure that encapsulates all 
the above and use it to predict changes to the constituents of a social index.  
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To our knowledge, at the time of writing, the extant literature numbers a very small number of 
studies. Here, we discuss the more characteristic ones. Becchetti et al. (2009) employ the Domini 
400 (now MSCI KLD 400 social index) for their analysis and find that stock deletions from the 
index produce negative short-term cumulative abnormal returns between 2% and 3% while no 
robust, statistically significant link can be detected when looking at additions to the index. These 
findings are echoed by Doh et al. (2010), who examine short-term reconstitution effects for the 
Calvert index and find that, while additions do not incite positive market reactions, deletions lead 
to a significant average decline in equity prices of more than 1.5%. Ramchander et al. (2012) also 
focus on the short-term recomposition effects of the MSCI KLD 400 but have a different point 
of emphasis. Their most original finding is that during index inclusion events, the new members 
of the index demonstrate modest but statistically significant abnormal market performance, 
whereas competing firms realize abnormal returns of similar magnitude but opposite sign. They 
attribute these results to a signalling effect that indicates that the added firm has gained a 
competitive advantage over its rivals by successfully managing its strategic relationships with key 
stakeholders (through the application of CSR principles and practices). Another study that is 
thematically related to ours comes from Lackmann et al. (2012). Unlike the previously mentioned 
papers, which focus on US social indices, this study focuses on recompositions of the DJSJ 
STOXX, a sustainability index whose constituents are stocks of leading, socially responsible 
European firms. The authors bring forward interesting evidence that suggests that inclusion in the 
DJSJ STOXX increases the reliability of the social responsibility information of the added firm 
and that this benefit (captured by short-term abnormal returns) varies according to, inter alia, 
various aspects of firm risk and economic uncertainty. 
It is clear from the paucity of evidence that much work remains to be done on socially responsible 
indices – in particular, in order to construct an over-arching analysis. Since all of the above-
mentioned studies only examine abnormal returns over short horizons around the events and do 
not consider other aspects of trading activity and performance5, it is challenging to postulate with 
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a reasonable degree of reliability if these abnormal returns can be explained by traditional financial 
explanations or if the case of social indices produces a unique kind of index effect. This study 
advances the emergent literature by providing more comprehensive evidence on the way in which 
stock performance is affected by the firm being added to or removed from a social stock index. 
By examining not only abnormal returns, but also trading volumes, and earnings per share in the 
short-run and the long-run, we shed light on the theoretical explanations for social index 
reconstitution effects that are observed. In addition, we make use of datasets which cover more 
extensive periods of time, compared to previous studies, a fact that adds to both the robustness 
and practical relevance of our work. Finally, we control for various other firm and time-specific 
variables to identify potential determinants of the related financial effects. 
Previous findings from the index effect literature 
The index effect, or the tendency for addition to or removal from a stock market index to cause 
changes in the prices or trading volumes of the underlying stocks, has been well documented for 
the stock market as a whole. The literature that investigates the index effect has grown 
simultaneously with the number and importance of index funds, institutional and individual 
investors who resolve to passive investing and index arbitrageurs. The advent of passive strategies 
and the perception that active managers do not beat the market led to the creation of the first 
index funds back in the 1970s. Today, these funds have evolved into more liquid forms, usually 
referred to as exchange-traded vehicles, the objective of which is to follow a particular benchmark. 
Institutions and private investors are more interested in indexing than ever before, because it offers 
lower management fees with negligible tracking errors. 
The addition to (or deletion from) the index may be triggered by the firm meeting (or not meeting 
anymore) the relevant inclusion criteria or by a variety of different corporate events (delisting, 
bankruptcy, takeover and others). An important dimension that contributes to the magnitude of 
the index effect is the way that index recompositions are announced in the market and 
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consequently, the level of anticipation of the relevant changes. Despite the efficient market 
hypothesis (Fama, 1970) predicting that index recompositions should not have any effect on stock 
prices6, significant price and volume changes connected to such events (mainly for the S&P 500 
index) have been observed in numerous studies. Consequently, a number of other conjectures 
have emerged in efforts to explain these results. These frameworks can be distinguished from one 
another according to whether the effects on company stock price and volume performance are 
temporary or permanent, the new information component that, arguably, comes along with each 
announcement of addition or deletion, and the investor behaviour after the event. 
The price pressure conjecture supports temporary price and volume effects for stocks involved in 
index recompositions due to short-term increases in demand (/supply) for firms added to 
(/deleted from) the index by tracker funds. Harris and Gurel (1986) reported a significant price 
increase of 3.13% on the date of an S&P 500 inclusion, which was almost fully reversed after two 
weeks. Woolridge and Ghosh (1986) provided similar evidence by finding a 2.77% price increase, 
while Arnott and Vincent (1986) reported a 2.91% price increase on the date of addition and a 
1.44% price drop on the date of deletion. 
The second framework relies on the imperfect substitutes assumption that differentiates index 
member firms from non-member firms and contradicts the Scholes argument (1972) that stocks 
are not “unique works of art” and their demand curves are kept flat by arbitrage between perfect 
substitutes. According to this conjecture, prices will change to eliminate any excess demand or 
supply in the market with no reversal, while trading activity will change temporarily until the new 
level of equilibrium is reached. Shleifer (1986), Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) and Morck and 
Yang (2002) examined the index effect and brought evidence in favour of this rationale. Tests for 
the imperfect substitutes conjecture regard index recomposition events as information-free. 
However, in 2003, Denis et al. proved that inclusion in the index was consistent with significant 
increases in earnings per share forecasts and significant improvements in realized earnings. Their 
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results were in favour of the third theory that refers to the assumption of new information content. 
According to this view, index recompositions are not information-free events, therefore the price 
effects on firm performance after the event period should be permanent. Later studies by Dhillon 
and Johnson (1991) and Cai (2007) were also in favor of the information content view.  
The fourth possible explanation relies on liquidity effects, which are mainly attributed to the 
increase of index funds. Specifically, inclusion in an index is an event that promises a permanent 
increase in the stock’s liquidity and therefore, prices and trading volumes shall both increase 
permanently to reflect this new advantage of the included stock. Edmister et al. (1996) were the 
first supporters of this view, finding permanent price effects after inclusion that did not reverse 
over time. More recently, Baran and King (2012) find that liquidity improves for added firms and 
declines for removed firms and that these changes can help explain the respective decrease and 
increase in the cost of equity of these firms.  
The last way to explain the index effect relies on Merton’s theory (1987) about market 
segmentation and investor recognition. According to this view, investors are aware of only a subset 
of the universe of available stocks. Thus, it can be argued that they only know of and are willing 
to invest in the stocks that are constituents of the index under investigation and that they require 
a lower return for holding these stocks. Chen et al. (2004) were the first to argue that inclusion in 
an index increases the overall investor awareness of the particular asset. As the stock becomes part 
of their portfolio universe, it is subject to stronger buying pressures and its required rate of return 
is permanently reduced. Since investors cannot be made unaware of a deleted stock, the price 
effects will not be symmetrically negative in the case of deletions from the index. It should be 
noted that much of the empirical literature supporting these theories has focused on the S&P 500. 
Consequently, the wider applicability of these frameworks to all indices can be debated − which is 
what this study is doing in the case of the MSCI KLD 400. There have only been occasional 
instances of studies that focus on other indices and provide support for some of the previously 
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mentioned theories (Biktimirov et al., 2004; Madhavan, 2003) that investigate the reconstitution 
effects of the Russell 2000 index.  
To sum up, the five alternative explanations that have been put forward to explain the traditional 
index effect are distinguishable in the existing literature according to whether the effects of 
recompositions are permanent or temporary with regard to stock prices and trading volumes. Table 
1 serves as a concise illustration of the characteristics that are consistent with each theoretical 
framework. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
It is not, however, clear that any of these explanations − mainly explored in the framework of the 
S&P 500 − would apply to social indices. For example, Standard and Poor’s base their decisions 
concerning the S&P 500 index composition on market capitalization, industry representation and 
corporate events (bankruptcy, decision to go private, etc.) whereas in the case of the MSCI KLD 
400, environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria are an explicit part of the recomposition 
process. Thus, it is reasonable to posit that while reconstitutions to S&P 500 may be information-
free events, the respective events in social indices are informationally meaningful. 
To be more specific, we anticipate that in the case of social indices, recomposition events may 
produce strong signalling effects concerning a firm’s level of corporate social performance and 
consequently its future financial performance, since the two concepts are related. We posit that 
the institutional seal of social responsibility that comes with the recomposition of social indices 
may not be treated as an information-free event; therefore, the information content explanation is 
likely to better explain any price and volume effects. Furthermore, although there might be 
asymmetries in the performance between added and deleted firms in the case of the social indices, 
these do not necessarily conform to the recognition view, since the nature of information revealed 
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in the market is likely to undermine the shadow cost theory and impact the deleted firms at a 
higher degree than the added firms. In summary, we postulate that social index recompositions are 
information-rich events and expect that they are associated with significant financial impacts, 
especially in the case of deletions, and that this unique ‘social index effect’ cannot be fully explained 
by the conventional index effect frameworks outlined above. 
Conceptual framework 
The generic literature that studies the index effect has put forward numerous conjectures in order 
to explain the price and trading volume changes of stocks that are added to or removed from the 
index of interest. In addition, the extensive work that has been conducted on the empirical 
relationship between corporate social responsibility and firm financial performance has revealed a 
series of stylized facts that characterize this link. Since this study falls in the cross-section of the 
two strands of financial research, we attempt to highlight certain aspects of the CSP–CFP link that 
may somewhat differentiate the observed social index effect from the respective index effect of 
conventional stock indices. 
The first observation we would like to make stems from the fact that corporate social performance 
is, admittedly, very hard to quantify. A wide range of measures have been employed to capture 
CSP. These include the amount of charitable contributions firms make, the lines of prose dedicated 
to CSP in corporate disclosures, surveys, lists and third-party social audits concerning the firms 
with the best reputation (in terms of their business practices) and their inclusion in social indices7. 
Due to the conceptual complexity that comes with CSR − along with the subjectivity and practical 
difficulties that can arise when attempting to measure it − stakeholders and investors interested in 
SRI are more likely to accept a firm’s CSR reputation as legitimate when it comes through third-
party institutional endorsement (Doh et al., 2010). Such a ‘social seal’ can be acquired in three 
ways: 
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(1) A firm’s participation in a list that is relevant to CSR (Fortune’s Best Companies to Work 
For, for example). 
(2) The ratings produced by the audits conducted by social ratings agencies and departments 
(the MSCI KLD database has been one of the most widely used in this respect). 
(3) Addition to a well-known social index with clearly established social criteria. 
Although each of the above has its merits and there is validity in using any of them to infer a firm’s 
CSR, reputation lists have been shown to be influenced by financial performance to a significant 
extent (Brown and Perry, 1994), while the results of third-party audits are not publicly available 
and the market’s reaction to them cannot be accurately pinpointed around a specific date. Thus, 
we argue that additions to and deletions from well-established social indices can provide market 
participants with a strong and clear public signal concerning the social performance of the relevant 
firms. This signal has the potential to significantly influence the demand for these stocks (through 
individual and institutional investors) and corroborate the demand generated by exchange traded 
funds (ETFs). Although social indices refer to a narrower part of the market compared to some 
of the conventional indices where index effects have been observed (S&P 500 being the most 
obvious case), there are still ample reasons to assume that such effects will also exist in their case. 
A second issue has to do with the potential asymmetric impact of additions and deletions on 
abnormal stock returns. The index effect literature has provided empirical results which 
substantiate either (1) the existence of a qualitatively symmetric impact where additions to the 
index lead to positive abnormal returns, and deletions from the index lead to negative abnormal 
returns (Arnott and Vincent, 1986; Lamoureux and Wansley, 1987) or (2) the existence of an 
asymmetric impact where additions to the index lead to statistically significant positive abnormal 
returns, but the abnormal returns related to deletions are less pronounced (Chen et al., 2004).  
However, when looking at social indices there is also the possibility that there is an asymmetric 
effect of the exact opposite nature (non-significant abnormal performance for additions, negative 
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returns for deletions). This is based on empirical evidence suggesting that corporate social 
responsibility and corporate social irresponsibility affect a firm’s financial performance to differing 
magnitudes. Wood and Jones (1995) observe that event studies making use of market-based 
measures of CFP reveal a trend for poor social performance to cause financial harm but do not 
provide evidence of financial benefits accruing from strong social performance. In addition, Meijer 
and Schuyt (2005) find that while consumers will boycott a firm if its CSP falls below some 
minimum threshold, high levels of social responsibility do not appear to increase product sales. 
On a more general level, it has been documented that “the economic impacts [of CSP] are more 
positive for issues reducing negative externalities than for issues generating positive externalities” 
(Lankoski, 2009, p. 218). More recently, Mishina et al. (2012) use social judgement theory to discuss 
in detail how conflicting indications of social responsibility and irresponsibility can shape 
stakeholders’ judgement of corporate character. Using the concept of ‘cue diagnosticity’, they argue 
that even in the presence of positive CSP indicators, negative CSP indicators can be more greatly 
influential on perceptions of a firm’s true corporate character and subsequently to its economic 
bottom line. 
Taking all the above studies into consideration, we posit that if the signal generated by a stock’s 
deletion from a social index is taken to mean not merely that the firm is less responsible than it 
was before, but rather that it has been found to be involved in certain socially or environmentally 
controversial issues, then the financial impact can be theorized to be greater than that of an 
addition to the index. Furthermore, we argue that the potential asymmetry in favour of more 
powerful financial impacts in the case of negative CSP indicators can be more easily observed in 
financial markets in the case of social index reconstitutions compared to changes in social ratings. 
We believe this to be the case mainly due to the high visibility of the social index recomposition 
events (especially compared to and contrasted with corporate ESG ratings that are usually only 
available to subscribers) and the immediacy by which they guide investment decisions made by 
tracker funds. In addition, the simple, binary nature of the index recomposition events (a firm is 
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either in or out of the index) makes the cognitive assessment of the phenomenon on the part of 
investors easier, compared to aggregating multidimensional CSP ratings and accordingly deducing 
whether a firm has become more or less socially conscious compared to each previous history and 
its peers. 
Lastly, we argue that by studying the social index effect we can avoid the alleged endogeneity 
problems and simultaneity bias that may arise due to the bidirectional causality between CSP and 
CFP (Waddock and Graves, 1997). The phenomenon of interest takes place in three discrete steps: 
(1) The firm changes its posture towards society and the environment and materializes this 
change through its operations and interactions with stakeholders. 
(2) Then, the committee or organization which is responsible for the composition of the index 
decides that the firm should be included to or removed from the index. 
(3) Finally, the market responds to the announcement of the decision of the committee.8  
Because of this particular sequence, there appears to be a clear path that leads from social 
performance to index participation and the corresponding market performance (separated in 
distinct stages), and there is no obvious mechanism that suggests an inverse contemporaneous 
relationship that runs from financial returns to CSP. It should be noted that the rationale behind 
this argument could be extended to other types of CSP-related events occurring in discrete points 
in time and whose financial effects could also be explored through the application of event study 
methodologies. Although the empirical CSP–CFP literature has mostly utilized regression analysis 
to establish a link between the two concepts, there are a few papers that follow this alternative 
methodological route. Godfrey et al. (2009) use an event study framework and document the 
insurance-like financial effects of CSR on announcements of regulatory sanctions on firms. In a 
similar fashion, Chollet and Cellier (2011) also conduct an event study in order to zoom in on the 
short-term market effects of social ratings announcements in Europe. We follow these topical 
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studies, as well as a variety of work from the mainstream finance literature, to guide the empirical 
methodology of this paper. We provide the respective details in the following section. 
Data and methodology 
The MSCI KLD 400 social index 
In order to conduct our analysis, we employ one of the oldest, most well-known and most 
frequently referenced US indices, the constituents of which include stocks of firms that conform 
to criteria of social responsibility and are available to ESG investors for benchmarking. This is the 
MSCI KLD 400 social index. Some additional clarifications concerning the inception, investment 
universe, non-ESG considerations, index reviews, the number of constituents and the relevant 
announcements for the index are warranted at this point. The MSCI KLD 400 index (formerly 
known as the Domini 400 social index or FTSE KLD 400 Social index) was launched by KLD 
Research and Analytics Inc. in 1990. Since then, the acquisition of KLD by RiskMetrics and the 
subsequent acquisition of RiskMetrics by MSCI in June 2010 has led to the latter managing the 
index. 
MSCI KLD 400 consists of 400 companies with the underlying investment universe being the 
MSCI USA Investable Market Index (IMI). MSCI seeks to maintain a sector representation for the 
index with weights similar to that of MSCI USA IMI. Firms involved in any of the following 
sectors are not included in the investment universe: Alcohol, Gambling, Tobacco, Military 
Weapons, Civilian Firearms, Nuclear Power and, more recently, Adult Entertainment, and 
Genetically Modified Organisms. MSCI also applies a series of stringent criteria with regard to, 
inter alia, the firm’s: 
 management of its impact on the local communities in which it operates 
 handling of human rights issues 
 commitment to charity and philanthropic activities 
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 commitment to employee safety and respect of diversity issues and labour rights 
 management of environmental challenges and reduction of hazardous outputs 
 standards in regards to product safety and quality 
 concern for corporate governance issues, the natural environment, its employees, human 
right issues and its involvement in controversial industries9  
There is also a size-segment representation with MSCI targeting to include a minimum count of 
200 large and mid-cap constituents. Recompositions of the index take place on a quarterly basis 
and the changes are implemented at the end of the month in which the review is held. According 
to the current index policy, although deletions from the index (especially those caused by corporate 
events) may occur between index reviews, no additions to replace those firms will be made until 
the next scheduled index review. This effectively means that for a period of time the index may 
consist of less than 400 firms10. In the years before 2011 (where the entirety of the sample of our 
study lies), recomposition announcements went to institutional/individual licensees and to the 
general public. This was initially done by a press release and later the announcements were posted 
online. Hence, addition and deletion announcements were readily observable by all market 
participants. 
In summary, MSCI KLD 400 constituents are deleted if they are deleted from the MSCI USA IMI 
Index (this includes delistings, mergers, bankruptcies and other corporate events), if they start 
being involved in one of the controversial industries previously outlined or if they have 
significantly deteriorating CSP performance. Additions to the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index are 
made to restore the number of index constituents to 400. Companies are added to the index based 
on criteria regarding CSP performance, sector alignment and size representation. The MSCI KLD 
400 index is tracked by the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index Fund, which is an ETF of the iShares 
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family (Blackrock) with a market cap of around $175 million. It runs on expense ratios ranging 
between 70 and 90 basis points.11 
Sample construction and calculation of abnormal returns 
MSCI has provided us with the lists of additions and deletions from the MSCI KLD 400 index 
respectively from inception until October of 2011. For the MSCI KLD 400 index, the earliest date 
for either an addition or deletion event is May 31, 1990 and the latest is July 14, 2010. 
The initial samples are not completely free of any bias that could lead to erroneous statistical 
inferences. In particular, these samples may include firms that are in financial distress and are likely 
to go bankrupt or become takeover targets at about the same time that they are deleted from the 
index. Naturally, such evolutions constitute confounding events and it is impossible to disentangle 
their influence on stock prices from that of the deletion events. The renaming of a firm on the 
other hand, is sufficient to lead to its deletion from the index (and its addition under its new name) 
but should generate only a very modest, if any, market response12. Thus, we exclude all firms for 
which their addition or deletion from the index is related to a merger, acquisition, spin-off, 
bankruptcy, suspension, deletion of trading or similar corporate events. 
Additionally, in order to ensure the robustness of our estimates, and to avoid thin trading issues, 
we impose a set of criteria for a firm to be included in our final sample. Specifically, we require: 
that there are no missing values in the time-series of the firm’s stock price for the period starting 
15 trading days before the event and ending 10 trading days after it; that there are no more than 
25 missing values in aggregate for the next 375 days (approximately one and a half years); that the 
average trading volume is greater than 100,000 shares over a period of one year before the event; 
and that, in order to avoid the effects of extreme values on our results, we do not include any firm-
day observations with an average abnormal return (AAR) of absolute value 20% or more. This last 
criterion leads to a small dynamic variability in the overall number of firms that are used in the 
calculation of daily AARs13. The requirements (along with data availability of prices, trading 
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volumes, earnings per share and market values for each firm, obtained by Thomson Reuters 
Datastream) lead to final samples of approximately 201 additions and 77 deletions for the MSCI 
KLD 400 index. 
In our analyses, we employ daily returns calculated on a closing price basis, adjusted for dividends. 
Daily observations are consistent with the method used by previous research and due to the large 
sample size, the problem of non-normality for daily data (Brown and Warner, 1985) is not an issue. 
Previous studies on index effect have employed a multitude of different methods for calculating 
abnormal returns with regards to the duration of the event window of interest. The most frequent 
choice amongst them is the market model; a parsimonious one-factor model that adjusts returns 
according to the level of the stock’s systematic risk. Although more complex models have also 
been used to account for additional factors that may be important determinants of stock returns 
(Fama and French, 1992; Carhart, 1997), it has been noted that: In practice the gains from employing 
multifactor models for event studies are limited. The reason for this is that the marginal explanatory power of additional factors 
beyond the market factor is small, and hence there is little reduction in the variance of the abnormal return. (Campbell et al., 
1997) 
Thus we elect to employ the market model in this study. In order to estimate the model parameters, 
we use a post-event period to count for potential selection criteria effects. Jain (1987) and Edmister 
et al. (1996) claim that the parameter estimates calculated using a pre-event estimation period will 
be biased, since it is highly probable that the firms of interest have performed well before their 
inclusion in the index. In fact, it may be exactly this strong performance that eventually led to their 
inclusion in the index. Copeland and Mayers (1982) have used a post-inclusion estimation period 
to confront the selection bias in their study for measuring the abnormal performance observed 
from the announcement of stock rankings of Value Line Investments. Concerning event studies 
for S&P 500 index changes, Denis et al. (2003) also used a post-inclusion estimation period.  
The linear specification of the market model for any security i at time t is: 
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where Rit and Rmt are the period-t returns on security i and the market portfolio ai is the return 
when the market portfolio returns are zero, βi is the sensitivity to each source of risk, and εit is the 
zero-mean disturbance term, respectively. We use S&P 500 as a proxy for the market portfolio. 
S&P 500 is the most closely followed US stock index and is widely considered to be representative 
of the US economy as a whole, having approximately 75% coverage of US equities.14 Model 
coefficients are estimated from a period of 250 trading days, starting 126 days after the event and 
ending 375 days after the event. We chose this period as we also require a lengthy observation 
window (which starts 10 days before the event and ends on 125 days after the event) that does not 
overlap with the estimation window for the purposes of investigating long-term stock 
performance. The illustration of the event windows is shown in Figure 1, where T is the event 
date.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The abnormal return for each stock will thus be given by:  
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The next step is for the abnormal returns calculated for every stock to be averaged against the total 
number of announcements N for each day of the event window of interest: 
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Lastly, these average abnormal returns can be summed over the entirety of the event window (from 
day 1 to day T) in order for the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) to be calculated: 
1,
1
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To test the statistical significance of the AARs and CAARs, two-tail t-tests are performed that 
are defined as follows. For testing AARs: 
(5)
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where AARt is the average abnormal return at time t and ˆ( )tS AAR  is the standard deviation of 
the average abnormal returns over the estimation period, given by the following formula: 
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For testing CAARs: 
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where CAAR1,T is the cumulative average abnormal stock return from day 1 to T and n is the 
number of days between 1 and T. The null hypothesis is that the AARs and CAARs should be 
zero. 
Abnormal trading volume 
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We examine volume data before and after the event period. If events are anticipated, significantly 
increased trading activity should be expected before the index recomposition event takes place. 
Volume data can give information about the timing of purchases caused by index funds and other 
institutional investors, as well as the demand that may have been caused by arbitrageurs.  
Abnormal volume performance is estimated using volume ratios, a method also employed by 
Harris and Gurel (1986) and Beneish and Whaley (1996). The average relative stock-to-S&P 500 
volume ratios are estimated over a period of 12 weeks (60 trading days) before the event period, 
and considered as the base volume for each added stock. The 60-day period starts 120 days before 
the event and ends 60 days before the event in order to avoid biases of inflated volume figures due 
to potential market anticipation of the index recomposition. They are then compared with the daily 
stock-to-index ratios observed during and after the event period. The null hypothesis is that the 
mean volume ratio across all firms for each day t of the event period should equal one. If the null 
is not rejected, then there is no significant abnormal volume on that day. The formulas for 
calculating volume ratios are given below: 
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where, the base relative volume ratio BVRi  is the average stock-to-index trading volume in the 12 
weeks before the event period, Vit and Vmt are the trading volume of each stock and the 
corresponding S&P 500 volume at each day t of the event window respectively, MVRt is the mean 
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volume ratio across firms at each day t of the event window and N is the number of firms in the 
sample. 
The significance of volume ratios is measured by the t-mean test defined as follows:
 t -mean =
MVRt
stdev(MVRt) N
        (11) 
Results 
Stock price performance 
Table 2 reports the AARs for additions to and deletions from the MSCI KLD 400 index for the 
period starting 10 days before the recomposition occurs and ending 15 days after it. No particular 
pattern emerges when looking at the abnormal returns of the additions sample. Their absolute 
values are quite low, statistically insignificant and their signs change from day to day within the 
observation window. The picture is clearer when focusing on the AARs of the deletions sample: 
The only statistically significant result is a negative abnormal return of –0.69%, significant at the 
5% level, which occurs on the event date. In addition, the fact that, on the period between the 
event (T) and up until two trading weeks after it (T+10, inclusive), the majority of observed 
abnormal returns (8 out of 11) are negative qualitatively corroborates the value-decreasing trend 
emerging for the stocks of deleted firms. 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 reports the CAARs connected to the recomposition events for both short-term and long-
term observation windows for the index. Overall, the cumulative performance of firms added to 
the index is actually negative in the short-term after the event, but this effect is partially 
counterbalanced by the positive returns that these firms reap shortly before their inclusion (an 
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observation that could be taken to mean that the market may have a modest ability to predict some 
of these inclusions a few days before they happen). However, none of these results pass the 
standard statistical tests. Stocks deleted from the index have CAARs approximately equal to –
1.60% for the first three trading weeks after the event, but still, these findings are not statistically 
significant. What is more impressive is the fact that, six months after the firms have been deleted 
from the social indices, the CAARs not only remain negative but accumulate further to a total of 
–14% in the case of the MSCI KLD 400 index (a result which is highly statistically significant at 
the 0.1% level).  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
In an effort to explore the possible determinants of the financial effects of social index 
recompositions, we run a series of cross-sectional regressions with the dependent variable 
iteratively being abnormal returns on the event date, cumulative abnormal returns for the [0,+15] 
period and cumulative abnormal returns on the [0,+125] period. We do this separately for each 
type of event. We use market capitalization and the ratio of book-to-market value as key regressors 
in these analyses as the seminal work of Fama and French (1992) suggests that they are important 
determinants of cross-sections of stock returns (beta is implicitly included by using the market 
model in the calculation of abnormal returns). We also include measures of firm profitability 
(return on equity), leverage (total debt to common equity), research and development intensity 
(R&D expenditure to total sales) and dividend yield. These variables have all been used as possible 
determinants of stock returns as well as moderators of the relationship between CSR and financial 
performance (Edmans, 2011; Oikonomou et al., 2012). We add a binary variable for the exchange 
where each stock is traded (where 1 is for stocks traded in NASDAQ and 0 is for stocks traded in 
NYSE), another binary variable that indicates whether the event takes place on the first half of the 
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history of the respective index (to partially capture dynamics of the investigated effects without 
significantly reducing available degrees of freedom), and a series of dummies to control for the 
supersector to which the firm belongs (based on the Industry Classification Benchmark). The 
results are contained in Tables 4 and 5 for additions and deletions, respectively.  
In the case of additions to the MSCI KLD, what stands out is that the longer-term financial effects 
of added firms are stronger for larger firms, for firms with strong fundamentals but with weaker 
operational performance and for firms listed in the NASDAQ exchange. On the other hand, for 
firms deleted from the index, it appears that there is an inverse relationship between the short-
term market reaction to the event and the dividend yield policy of the firm. No other characteristic 
appears to be connected with abnormal financial performance following deletions in the short-run 
or long-run. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Although the cross-sectional analysis of possible determinants of the financial performance during 
and after the recomposition events is not truly revealing, one point that is worth noting is that the 
overall explanatory power of the utilized set of variables is much higher for deletions 
(approximately ranging between 36% and 44%) compared to additions (ranging between 14% and 
25%). This fact indicates that, although no particular firm characteristic can be consistently 
identified as an important determinant of the respective abnormal returns, the overall connection 
between this standard set of firm-/stock-specific factors and financial performance is significantly 
stronger for deletions compared to additions. 
Taking all the above results into consideration, it appears that there are no significant short-term 
price pressures related to stocks added to the social index. The same cannot be said about deleted 
firms, as we find negative and significant abnormal returns of –0.69% for MSCI KLD on the event 
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date. This negative effect accumulates to –1.61% three trading weeks after the event. Given the 
modest market capitalizations of ETFs of the index (less than $200 million), it appears plausible 
that there are no material price pressure effects caused by institutional trading activity during 
recomposition events. On the other hand, there is stronger support for a negative long-term price 
effect connected to firms being deleted from the index. Not only does the cumulative performance 
remain negative for several months, but it is also significantly reinforced, reaching  –14% 
approximately six months after the event. This finding of a long-term negative price effect of 
stocks deleted from MSCI KLD 400 makes us reject the price pressure view in the framework of 
social indices. Furthermore, the fact that price effects are only apparent in deletions and not 
additions also goes against the investor recognition framework (where the exact opposite would 
be expected). 
Trading volume performance and effects on earnings per share 
Trading during index recomposition announcements 
According to previous findings, there are two main parties that are involved in trading index 
recompositions. The first one represents index fund managers, the mandate of which is very 
specific. Passive trackers will wait until the stock exchange’s closing auction on the event date to 
rebalance their portfolios and avoid tracking errors. Kappou et al. (2010) showed that in the case 
of the S&P 500, the volume levels on the event date were almost 16 times higher than normal and 
most trading activity was concentrated towards the last 5 minutes of the trading day, indicating 
that index fund managers were more concerned with tracking error than with firm performance 
during the event window. The other party involved in index recompositions represents the 
arbitrageurs, and in cases where index changes are preannounced, they will trade on the first date 
after announcement by buying (/selling) the added (/deleted) stock and close out the position on 
the event date, when index fund managers are entering the market. 
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In the case of the MSCI KLD 400 index, we anticipate any abnormal trading activity to concentrate 
on the event date and a few days after. Any abnormal trading before the event could provide 
evidence of anticipation of the index changes by analysts, who follow the relevant stocks and who 
closely monitor the rankings of socially responsible companies. 
The effects of social index recompositions on trading volume 
Table 6 shows the volume ratios for both added and deleted firms for the same observation period 
as discussed above. Although the figures for the period before the event are not significant in the 
case of additions, the stocks of deleted firms are characterized by increased trading activity 
throughout the one-week period before the event date, providing evidence of anticipation of the 
coming event. On the event date, the average volume ratio of the added stocks is 1.30 times higher 
than usual, but is insignificant, whereas the average volume ratio of the deleted stocks is almost 
twice as high (1.93) as normal and is statistically significant at the 5% level. Both of these numbers 
are the peaks of the trading volume ratios of the addition and deletion samples in the post-event 
period. The abnormal volume activity remains significant for a period of almost one week after 
the event, but only for the deletions sample. This may indicate that the market appears to be 
concerned more with deletions than additions, when it comes to information connected to changes 
in the level of corporate social performance of the firms. Accordingly, index fund managers appear 
more inclined to trade immediately after a firm is deleted from the index. With regards to the long-
run performance of the volume ratios, we can see that the trading patterns of added stocks remain 
relatively stable, whereas for deleted firms, the upward trend reverses and trading volumes decrease 
after the event dates (Figures 2 and 3). From all the above findings, we conclude that only the 
deletions sample of the MSCI KLD 400 index experiences significant trading volume effects, 
which are reversed in the long run. It also seems apparent that the information signal in the case 
of deletions is strong enough to cause a short-term abnormal trading activity, even in the absence 
of indexed assets (and potentially arbitrageurs). 
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6, FIGURE 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Overall, we find temporary volume effects when looking at deletions from social stock indices. 
The fact that these impacts are not persistent makes us reject the liquidity effect view. In 
conclusion, we have thus far looked at prices and trading volumes related to recompositions of 
social stock indices and we have found evidence that there are permanent negative price effects 
and temporary changes in trading activity only for deleted firms. By comparing these findings with 
the information contained in Table 1, we find that they are not compatible with the price pressure, 
liquidity effect and investor recognition explanations and are more consistent with the information 
content and imperfect substitute theories. It is particularly hard to distinguish these theories, as 
they predict the same outcomes as far as effects on prices and trading volumes are concerned, and 
their main difference is whether these effects are information-free or not. In the case of social 
indices it would be very hard to argue that reconstitutions are information-free events, as they are 
directly related with publicly conveying material information about the social and environmental 
posture of firms (see Conceptual framework). So we believe that, according to our findings, the 
most prevalent index effect view for this type of indices is the information content hypothesis, but 
with the effects being asymmetric and stronger for deletions. To further test the informational 
relevance of social index recompositions, we look at firm operational performance in the next 
subsection. 
Index rebalancing and operational performance 
The S&P 500 index effect literature provides theories that contradict one another when it comes 
to the effects of index membership on company performance. Malkiel and Radisich (2001) find 
no evidence of increase in company valuation after inclusion, by using a discounted cash-flow 
model that was applied to a sample of index-member and non-index-member firms. Morck and 
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Yang (2002) on the other hand, provide evidence that index inclusion is associated with 
significantly higher company valuation, by observing the firm’s Tobin ‘q’ ratio. A recomposition 
of the MSCI KLD 400 index can provide signals of changes in the level of a corporation’s social 
performance, which may consequently affect the future economic performance of the relevant 
stocks. Indeed, the majority of the CSP–CFP literature at the firm level suggests that there is a 
positive connection, although its characteristics are debated (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky 
et al., 2003). The potential change in a firm’s valuation is consistent with the ‘information content’ 
assumption, on the basis that the seal of social responsibility represents a certification effect, which 
could lead to improved financial performance. 
We examine firm earnings before and after the event of additions to and deletions from the MSCI 
KLD 400 index. The variable we employ is earnings per share (EPS) obtained from Thomson 
Reuters DataStream. The pre-event earnings per share are computed for each firm using a period 
of one calendar year before the recomposition event (average of earnings over four calendar 
quartets). Accordingly, the post-event earnings per share are computed for each firm using a period 
of one calendar year after the event. We do not examine EPS for longer than a year after the 
recomposition due to potentially confounding effects from firm-specific events other than index 
membership. An equality of means test is performed to identify whether changes in earnings per 
share are statistically significant. Table 7 presents the relevant results. In the case of additions, the 
level of EPS for the index member firms increases by 5.96% (from $1.37 to $1.45) whereas, for 
deletions, EPS fell by 6.54% (from $2.20 to $2.06).15  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The above results are qualitatively in line with our expectations about the effect of the social 
(ir)responsibility factor on company performance, although the differences are not statistically 
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significant. It appears that the detriments of social irresponsibility are mildly more impactful than 
the benefits that come with the gold seal of social responsibility. 
Measurement of changes in corporate social performance surrounding index reconstitution events 
In an effort to substantiate our claim that the financial impacts surrounding social index 
recomposition are indeed driven by changes in CSP, we look into the dynamic evolution of the 
index constituents’ social scores, as recorded in the KLD STATS database. KLD rates firms using 
multiple CSP indicators within seven ‘qualitative issue areas’ (community relations, diversity issues, 
employee programs, environment issues, product safety and quality, corporate governance, and 
human rights) and also records their involvement in controversial sectors (military contracting, 
nuclear power, firearms, alcohol, tobacco or gambling). The rating is done separately on strengths 
and concerns of the same social dimension and is recorded on KLD STATS on an annual basis 
(though the assessment of CSP is ongoing). We average indications of strengths (/concerns) across 
all dimensions of CSP for each firm in each year to create annual disaggregated measures of social 
responsibility (/irresponsibility) and examine how these measures change in the year before, during 
and after the firm is added or removed from the MSCI KLD 400. 
As expected, our findings indicate that, on average, CSP increases for firms added to the index and 
decreases for those being removed from it. We find that the aggregated strengths score increases 
for 50 of the firms added to MSCI KLD in the year leading to the addition (it is reduced for 17 
and remains the same for the rest), with the average increase being 0.019. The trend continues in 
the year following the addition, with 39 firms having increased social responsibility (35 decreased 
and the rest remained as they were) and the average increase being 0.013. Similarly, aggregated 
indications of social irresponsibility increase for 12 firms in the year leading to their deletion (drop 
for 8 firms and remain constant for the others) and for 26 firms in the year following their deletion 
(they reduce for 7 firms and stay the same for the rest). The aggregated scores for social 
irresponsibility increase by 0.03 on average in this period16. Overall, these numbers corroborate 
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our view that social index recomposition events constitute certifications of corporate social 
performance, thus making them differently framed phenomena compared to those related to 
conventional equity indices. 
Discussion 
Principal findings and reconciliation with other studies 
The essence of our findings is that inclusion of a firm in the MSCI KLD 400 social index does not 
produce economically substantial or statistically significant, short-term or long-term abnormal 
returns. However, deletion of a stock from the index results, on average, in negative cumulative 
abnormal returns of approximately –1.60% within 15 trading days after the event. The long-term 
financial performance of the deleted stocks is also negative, with the firms that are removed from 
MSCI KLD 400 index experiencing an especially strong, negative performance which accumulates 
to –14% in a matter of six months after the event. Deletions are also associated with temporary 
increases in trading volumes and a decrease in ex-post operational performance (although the latter 
is not statistically significant). Additional analysis reveals increases in CSP for firms being added 
to the MSCI KLD 400 and a deterioration of social performance for firms being deleted from it. 
Taking all the above into account, we conclude that there is a distinct ‘social index effect’ that 
differs from the financial effects of recompositions in conventional equity indices in that deletions 
are connected with more significant economic and/or statistical market returns, trading activity 
and post-event earnings. This principal finding corroborates recent evidence of the CSP–CFP 
literature, which shows that negative CSP is more strongly related to negative CFP than positive 
CSP is connected to positive CFP. 
Looking at previous studies focusing on social indices in particular, short-term results are in line 
with the findings of Becchetti et al. (2009) and Doh et al. (2010). Conversely, at first glance, the 
inferences drawn seem to contradict the results of Ramchander et al. (2012). Ramchander et al. 
(2012) focus on short-term reconstitution effects for the MSCI KLD 400 and also find modest, 
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positive cumulative abnormal returns for additions (0.50% for the first three days after addition, 
significant at the 10% level). However, their sample is approximately 20% smaller than ours and 
stops in 2007 (whereas our study has 4 more years of recent additional data). Given that we are 
referring to reasonably small sample sizes, these differences in the datasets may fully explain why 
the modest results for additions are not confirmed by our study. Lackmann et al. (2012) also find 
evidence of significant positive investor reactions to additions to the DJSJ STOXX index 
(approximately 1.95% for the [–5, 5] event window and 4.70% for the [–10, 10] event window). 
Yet the difference between the results of Lackmann et al. (2012) and our study should not be 
surprising given that the stocks of the DJSJ STOXX are European (and listed in many different 
countries), and it has been documented that the US and Europe diverge in terms of the financial 
impact of CSR (Von Arx and Ziegler, 2013; Kolbel and Busch, 2013). Furthermore, the dataset of 
Lackmann et al. starts in 2001, whereas ours begins in 1990, making the dynamics of the CSR–
CFP link more complex in our case. 
Uniqueness of the social index effect 
Our study shows that for the MSCI KLD 400, there appears to be an asymmetric social index 
effect, whereby deletions are connected with negative abnormal performance (a result that 
becomes stronger with time) and trading activity spikes around the event (a result that is not 
persistent in the long-run) but additions do not lead to any significant change in market prices. 
From the perspective of the generic index effect literature, these findings do not adhere to any of 
the explanations that have been given in the past. Unlike some of the conclusions drawn from part 
of the literature exploring the effects of S&P 500 recompositions, the social index effect appears 
to be informationally meaningful (as expected, given the differences in the criteria involved in the 
two types of indices). The persistent nature of the price effect on deletions makes us reject the 
price pressure conjecture. The temporary effects in trading volumes contradict the liquidity effect 
view. The fact that both effects are statistically robust for deleted firms but not for added firms 
Is there a Gold Social Seal? 
36 
goes against the investor recognition framework. Lastly, the nature of social indices along with the 
qualitative findings coming from the comparison of firm operational performance before and after 
they are added to (or deleted from) the index suggest that these are not information-free events 
and that in this way they do not conform to the imperfect substitutes view17. 
Therefore, the framework that seems to be better fitted to explain the findings of this study is 
consistent with the informational content. However, this view in its traditional version cannot explain 
this asymmetry in the financial effects of addition and deletion events in social stock indices. We 
posit that the stylized characteristics of these effects are particularly compatible with empirical and 
conceptual aspects surrounding social indices, i.e. that the information content of social index 
recomposition is distinct. 
In particular, the asymmetric impact of social index recompositions is fully aligned with a great 
deal of empirical work in the CSP–CFP literature (Wood and Jones, 1995; Meijer and Schuyt, 2005; 
Lankoski, 2009; Oikonomou et al., 2012), which suggests that corporate social responsibility and 
corporate social irresponsibility are not the flip sides of the same coin and that the negative 
financial impact of the latter is, ceteris paribus, stronger than the positive financial impact of the 
former. Thus, because a stock’s deletion from a social index can be interpreted as a strong, highly 
visible signal produced by an independent institution that the firm has been involved in some kind 
of a social or environmental transgression, it is plausible to find that its financial effects are greater 
than those of additions to the index (which is a signal for the firm being a strong social performer). 
This social information content effect is also consistent with the results of our additional analyses, 
and thus we believe the relevant view to be the most compatible with our findings. 
In addition, as Doh et al. (2010) note, there may be a behavioural element involved in the 
explanation of the differential index effect. In particular, Baumeister et al. (2001) have shown that 
individuals tend to react more intensely to negative rather than positive pieces of new information. 
Mishina et al. (2012) also argue that indications of corporate social irresponsibility are perceived 
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by stakeholders to be more highly diagnostic of a firm’s true moral character than indications of 
social responsibility. In addition, it has been shown in the literature of financial economics that 
“losses and disadvantages have greater impact on preferences than gains and advantages” (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1991, p. 1039), a type of loss aversion utility theory, which is also in line with our 
findings. These cognitive biases could also be used to explain, in part, why we document negative 
short-run abnormal returns associated with deletions and no material price changes for additions, 
but, admittedly, they do not explain the respective differences in long-term stock performance 
connected to the two types of events. 
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Conclusions 
This study extends the extant CSP–CFP literature by providing comprehensive analyses and 
interesting findings on whether the financial performance of firms is affected when added to or 
removed from a social equity index. The nature of this investigative setting means it avoids the 
frequently encountered endogeneity criticism, and helps in capturing the effects of highly visible 
CSP-related events in the financial markets. Our investigation of not merely abnormal returns, but 
also trading volumes and earnings per share, both in the short-run and long-run, allows us to delve 
deeper in the respective part of the literature than previous studies. By carefully considering the 
combination of our results and contrasting them with those that are compatible with traditional 
views for index reconstitution effects, we can conclude that the social index effect is unique: There 
is a clear asymmetry in financial impacts between addition and deletion events, in the social stock 
index we investigate, with the latter being stronger than the former. 
The inferences drawn from these analyses are of interest to a variety of different parties. There are 
important lessons for firm managers and corporate executives; the high visibility and legitimacy to 
the claim of corporate social irresponsibility that comes with the exit from a social index can be 
heavily penalized by the market in the medium-term, thus making it less effective for the firm to 
refinance itself through the equity market. The post-event deterioration in operational 
performance of deleted firms could also be attributed to the weakening of their strategic 
relationships with key stakeholders, who value corporate social responsibility. Hence, it is 
important that firm managers not only promote but also maintain high levels of CSP through their 
companies’ operations and business practices. To be more specific, a firm’s involvement with a 
controversial business sector (including activities relating to alcohol, gambling, tobacco, military 
weapons, firearms, nuclear power, among others) will trigger the relevant exclusionary screening 
criterion from the index and the resulting deletion of the firm will be seen as a highly visible, 
legitimate endorsement of the company becoming more irresponsible in its attitude towards key 
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stakeholders. The damage in the firm’s reputational capital will also be reflected in an increase in 
the cost of equity, both in the short- and long-run. A similarly hazardous sequence of events 
leading to a firm’s delisting from the MSCI KLD 400 social index can be initiated by other 
indications of declining CSP, such as: violations of employee health and safety standards, 
significant production of ozone-depleting chemicals, affirmative action controversies, 
disrespecting the sovereignty and intellectual property of indigenous peoples or regulatory actions 
relating to anti-trust allegations. Corporate managers should consider all of the above should they 
want to effectively manage the financial and operational risks that come with the resulting loss of 
the gold social seal. 
Additionally, managers of socially responsible mutual funds, index fund and hedge fund managers, 
along with other investors, have a more complete perspective towards the sign, magnitude, 
significance and time-horizon of the price effects that accompany social index recompositions and 
an appreciation of how these may vary between additions and deletions. While there are no material 
gains to be reaped from additions to social indices, there are indications that the selling (or short-
selling) of the stocks that have been deleted from the social index on the day of the event and its 
subsequent buy-back after three weeks leads to an average abnormal return of 1.6%, before 
transaction costs. More importantly, the cumulative, risk-adjusted market performance of deleted 
stocks is significantly negative for several months after the event, thus they constitute unattractive 
assets for investors who base their decisions on financial, non-financial (ethical or religious) criteria 
or both. 
Despite our best efforts to create a more comprehensive framework concerning the social index 
effect, there are a number of ways in which the literature can be further expanded. First of all, the 
modest market capitalization of the ETFs and the absence of a derivatives market can help to 
explain why our study does not, for the most part, document significant short-term price pressures 
surrounding index recompositions, which can be attributed to the demand of these indices as 
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packaged products. However, assuming that the rapid growth of ETFs on social indices will 
continue, this is a limitation that will fade in time, thus making the social index effect worthwhile 
for scholars and practitioners to revisit. In addition, it would be interesting for researchers to 
investigate whether there is variability in the financial effects of deletions of firms from social 
indices according to the particular kind of controversy that led to the deletion. For example, it may 
be that deletions associated with environmental transgressions are more heavily penalized by the 
market compared to deletions connected with corporate governance issues (or vice-versa). 
Relatedly, the use of the MSCI KLD 400 index limits our inferences to the context of US firms. 
Looking at social indices that include firms from different countries would aid in identifying 
whether the asymmetric social index effect holds in a global framework. 
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Appendix 
ESG criteria for the MSCI KLD 400 
MSCI’s ESG research framework generates an analysis and rating of each company’s management 
of its environmental, social and governance performance. The rating criteria address a company’s 
ESG performance in the context of five categories, covering key corporate stakeholders. 
 Environment – rate a company’s management of its environmental challenges, including its 
effort to reduce or offset the impacts of its products and operations. 
 Community and Society – measure how well a company manages its impact on the 
communities where it operates, including its treatment of local population, its handling of 
human rights issues and its commitment to philanthropic activities. 
 Employees and Supply Chain – assess a company’s record of managing employees, contractors 
and suppliers. Issues of particular interest include labor-management relations, anti-
discrimination policies and practices, employee safety, and the labor rights of workers 
throughout the company’s supply chain. 
 Customers – measure the quality and safety record of a company’s products, its marketing 
practices, and any involvement in regulatory or anti-competitive controversies. 
 Governance and Ethics – address a company’s investor relations and management practices, 
including company sustainability reporting, board accountability and business ethics 
policies and practices. 
MSCI applies its proprietary ESG rating framework to each company by selecting the ESG rating 
criteria most relevant to each firm. To evaluate a company, analysts review more than 500 data 
points and score more than 100 indicators. MSCI expresses a company’s ESG performance as a 
numerical score and on a letter-based rating scale. The ratings fall on a nine-point scale from AAA 
to C. Scores and ratings are not normalized across individual industries or the overall company 
universe. This means that one industry may have no companies that receive any “A” ratings, while 
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another industry may have no companies with “C” ratings. In addition, the index excludes 
companies with significant business activities involving alcohol, tobacco, firearms, gambling, 
nuclear power or military weapons. 
For additional information on the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index Methodology, the interested reader 
is directed to: www.msci.com/products/indexes/esg/methodology.html 
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Notes 
1 Broadly defined as a process whereby fund managers incorporate environmental, social and corporate 
governance considerations in the security selection process, in an effort to maximize portfolio performance 
while respecting the social concerns of investors. 
2 The data mentioned in this discussion are based on the 2010 Report on Socially Responsible Investing 
Trends in the United States, created by the US Social Investment Forum, last accessed May, 16th 2012 at 
ussif.org. 
3 Schröder (2007) provides the details of 29 different SRI stock indices. At the time of writing, MSCI has 
more than 80 different ESG (environmental, social, governance) indices while the family of Dow Jones 
Sustainability Indices numbers 19 members; and these are just two ESG index providers. 
4 In the United States, “twenty-six exchange traded funds (ETFs) with $4.0 billion in total assets were 
identified as incorporating ESG criteria. Although ETFs accounted for only 1% of the total assets of all 
ESG investment vehicles, their assets have grown 225% since 2007, the fastest of all registered investment 
vehicles”(Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States, 2010, US Social Investment 
Forum, p. 9). 
5 Lackmann et al. (2012) also examine these issues, but as possible determinants of the magnitude of 
investor reactions to index reconstitutions and not as focal points of the empirical analysis – as is the case 
in this study. 
6 Assuming that they have no impact on the discounted sum of the expected future firm profits accruing 
to shareholders. 
7 A more detailed discussion of the various CSP metrics that have been used is provided by Margolis et al. 
(2009). 
8 There is also the possibility that due to leakage of information or the market’s ability to forecast the 
decision of the committee, the effects of the reconstitution of the index are gradually incorporated to the 
prices of the stocks prior to the respective announcement. 
9 For further information about the index’s inclusion and deletion criteria, the reader is directed to MSCI 
KLD 400 Social Index Methodology manual, May 2011. A brief overview of the criteria is placed in the 
appendix of the paper. 
10 It is worth mentioning that in its earlier days of the (then) KLD 400, exits from and entries to the index 
would most usually coincide, would take place outside of periodic reviews and with announcements and 
recompositions occurring simultaneously. 
11 Numbers taken from http://us.ishares.com/product_info/fund/overview/DSI.htm , last accessed June 
25, 2012. 
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12 We have checked the frequency of such events in our final deletion sample. It is very limited and does 
not influence the conclusions we draw. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.  
13 For our observation period, this criterion leads to a reduction of the overall additions sample by 0.15% 
and the deletions sample by 0.8%. Thus, we believe that applying this filter to remove the effect of extreme 
outliers does not severely influence the representativeness of the final samples we utilize for our analyses. 
14 http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-500/en/us/?indexId=spusa-500-usduf--p-us-l-- last 
accessed June, 5th 2012. 
15 In order to account for biases resulting from simultaneous changes in the broader earning performance 
of US corporates, we perform a similar analysis by examining Earnings Ratios expressed by each company’s 
total earnings as a percentage of the concurrent total earnings of the S&P 500 index. The results are not 
reported here for the sake of parsimony but are qualitatively identical to those coming from unadjusted 
earnings. 
16 Although these numbers look small, the average scores of aggregated strengths for the entire KLD panel 
dataset consisting of circa 38,000 firm-year observations is 0.049 (for aggregated concerns it is 0.073). Thus 
the changes are of significant magnitude.  
17 The reader is directed to Table 1 for an overview of the characteristics that are compatible with each 
theory that tries to explain the index effect. 
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Table 1:  Index effect theories and their empirical characteristics 
 
Effect on stock prices Effect of trading volumes 
Price pressure Temporary Temporary 
 
Imperfect substitutes Permanent Temporary 
 
Information content Permanent Temporary 
 
Liquidity effect Permanent Permanent 
 
Investor recognition 
Permanent for additions, 
temporary for deletions 
Temporary  
Social index effect ? ?     
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Table 2:  Short-run abnormal return performance of stocks added to and deleted 
from the MSCI KLD 400 social index 
  Additions sample Deletions sample 
Day 
Abn. 
Ret. t-statistic 
N of 
firms Abn. ret. t-statistic 
N of 
firms 
T–10 –0.10% (–0.64) 201 0.29% (0.85) 77 
T–9 0.11% (0.65) 201 0.40% (1.17) 77 
T–8 0.16% (0.95) 202 –0.15% (–0.44) 78 
T–7 0.18% (1.11) 201 –0.16% (–0.47) 78 
T–6 –0.01% (–0.04) 202 –0.17% (–0.50) 75 
T–5 –0.17% (–1.04) 201 0.03% (0.08) 74 
T–4 0.05% (0.32) 202 0.29% (0.86) 78 
T–3 0.11% (0.66) 202 0.53% (1.55) 77 
T–2 0.19% (1.14) 202 0.09% (0.26) 72 
T–1 0.03% (0.17) 202 –0.04% (–0.11) 73 
T 0.02% (0.14) 200 –0.69% (–2.02)* 72 
T+1 0.01% (0.09) 202 0.11% (0.31) 76 
T+2 –0.03% (–0.19) 202 –0.50% (–1.46) 73 
T+3 0.00% (–0.01) 202 –0.38% (–1.12) 75 
T+4 0.09% (0.52) 202 0.58% (1.65) 75 
T+5 0.16% (0.95) 201 –0.16% (–0.47) 76 
T+6 –0.32% (–1.94) 199 0.02% (0.06) 77 
T+7 –0.27% (–1.61) 202 –0.09% (–0.26) 74 
T+8 –0.11% (–0.67) 202 –0.30% (–0.89) 74 
T+9 –0.28% (–1.67) 201 –0.40% (–1.17) 73 
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T+10 0.18% (1.07) 202 –0.23% (–0.66) 73 
T+11 –0.07% (–0.45) 201 –0.08% (–0.25) 77 
T+12 –0.05% (–0.33) 202 0.18% (0.54) 78 
T+13 0.28% (1.70) 202 –0.12% (–0.36) 77 
T+14 –0.14% (–0.84) 202 –0.42% (–1.24) 77 
T+15 –0.29% (–1.74) 202 0.19% (0.57) 77 
 
Note: Day indicates each key date of the event window with event date at time T as a point of 
reference. Abnormal returns are defined as the average of the differences between raw returns and 
market model returns for each date of the event window. T-statistic is the standard t-test measuring 
the significance of abnormal returns during each date of the event period. with * indicating 
significance at 5% level. N represents the number of firms in the equivalent daily sample. 
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Table 3:  Cumulative abnormal return performance of stocks added to and 
deleted from the MSCI KLD 400 social index 
  Additions sample Deletions sample 
Window CAARs t-statistic CAARs t-statistic 
T–5 to T–1 0.21% (0.56) 0.90% (1.18) 
T–3 to T–1 0.32% (1.14) 0.58% (0.98) 
T–1 to T+1 0.07% (0.23) –0.62% (–1.05) 
T only 0.02% (0.14) –0.69% (–2.02)* 
T+1 to T+15 –0.84% (–1.32) –1.61% (–1.22) 
T to T+125 –2.88% (–1.56) –14.00% (–3.65)*** 
 
Note: Window defines the number of days taken into account with event date at 
time T as a point of reference. CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return 
of the firms for the corresponding window and t-statistic is the standard t-test 
measuring the significance of the cumulative average abnormal returns for the 
defined period, with * indicating significance at the 5% level and *** indicating 
significance at the 0.1% level. 
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          Table 4: MSCI KLD 400 additions: Cross-sectional abnormal return attribution regressions 
Dep. Variable: AR on Event date 
 
Dep. Variable: CAAR[0,+15] Dep. Variable: CAAR[0,+125] 
N: 190    N: 192   N: 193  
Variable Coefficient t-stat.  Coefficient  t-stat.  Coefficient t-stat. 
Market cap. –0.0005 (–0.047) 
 
0.0000 (0.716)  0.0000 (2.635)** 
Book to market value –0.0003 (–0.923)  –0.0003 (–0.471)  0.0154 (2.117)* 
Return on equity 
 
0.0037 (0.715)  –0.0014 (–0.115)  –0.1372 (–2.011)* 
Leverage 
 
–0.0006 (–0.903)  –0.0005 (–0.370)  –0.0022 (–0.237) 
Dividend yield 
 
–0.0019 (–1.581)  0.0021 (0.920)  0.0088 (0.490) 
R&D intensity 
 
–0.0092 (–0.355)  –0.0771 (–0.887)  –1.0638 (–2.651)** 
Exchange –0.0046 (–0.984)  0.0271 (2.562)*  0.1229 (2.062)* 
Time effects YES   YES   YES  
Industry effects YES   YES   YES  
R-squared 20.83% 
  
14.13%   24.57% 
 
 
 
*Denotes significance at the 5% level and **denotes significance at the 1% level. Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard 
estimators are applied. 
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Table 5: MSCI KLD 400 deletions: Cross-sectional abnormal return attribution regressions 
Dep. variable: AR on event date 
 
Dep. variable: CAAR[0,+15] Dep. variable: CAAR[0,+125] 
N: 72    N: 76    N: 76  
Variable Coefficient t-stat.  Coefficient t-stat.   Coefficient t-stat. 
Market cap. 0.0000 (1.056)  0.0000 (0.295)   0.0000 (1.229) 
Book to market value 0.0004 (0.358)  0.0004 (0.130)   0.0080 (0.198) 
Return on equity 
 
–0.0003 (–0.165)  –0.0036 (–0.509)   –0.0097 (–0.175) 
Leverage 
 
–0.0003 (–1.192)  0.0011 (1.285)   –0.0040 (–0.185) 
Dividend yield 
 
–0.0081 (–2.607)*  –0.0117 (–3.268)***   –0.0322 (–1.109) 
R&D intensity 
 
–0.2366 (–1.735)  0.1305 (1.499)   0.9569 (1.018) 
Exchange –0.0056 (–0.345)  0.0072 (0.359)   0.0759 (0.453) 
Time effects YES   YES    YES  
Industry effects YES   YES    YES  
R-squared 42.46%   43.88%    35.81%  
 
*Denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 0.1% level. Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard 
estimators are applied. 
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Table 6: Effect of additions to and deletions from the MSCI KLD 400 index on trading volume 
  Additions sample Deletions sample 
Day Volume ratio t- statistic Volume ratio t- statistic 
T–10 1.04 (0.82) 1.42 (1.58) 
T–9 1.04 (0.68) 1.23 (1.07) 
T–8 1.04 (0.57) 1.16 (0.92) 
T–7 1.02 (0.33) 0.90 (–1.51) 
T–6 1.00 (–0.02) 1.38 (1.91) 
T–5 1.09 (1.10) 2.04 (1.76) 
T–4 1.00 (0.09) 1.48 (1.30) 
T–3 1.00 (0.06) 1.21 (1.56) 
T–2 0.95 (–1.12) 1.74 (2.19)* 
T–1 1.05 (0.63) 2.37 (1.97) 
T 1.30 (1.73) 1.93 (2.48)* 
T+1 1.13 (1.41) 1.68 (1.67) 
T+2 1.05 (0.67) 1.47 (2.14)* 
T+3 1.07 (0.99) 1.29 (2.13)* 
T+4 1.18 (2.22)* 1.31 (2.49)* 
T+5 1.07 (1.16) 1.20 (1.43) 
T+6 1.08 (1.37) 1.00 (0.04) 
T+7 1.02 (0.50) 1.05 (0.63) 
T+8 1.03 (0.55) 1.10 (0.82) 
T+9 1.05 (0.76) 1.53 (1.64) 
T+10 1.08 (1.22) 1.39 (1.59) 
T+11 1.10 (1.53) 1.62 (1.51) 
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T+12 1.05 (0.74) 1.19 (0.97) 
T+13 1.06 (1.01) 1.15 (1.10) 
T+14 1.08 (0.91) 0.95 (–0.72) 
T+15 1.07 (0.68) 0.96 (–0.60) 
 
Note: Day indicates each key date of the event window with event date at time T as a point of 
reference. Volume Ratio is the average volume ratio over the base volume ratio (estimated over 60 days 
before the event period) for each day of the event window. T-statistic is the standard t-test 
measuring the significance of the average volume ratios each day of the event period, with * 
indicating significance at 5% level. 
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Table 7:  Pre-event and post-event earnings per share for MSCI KLD 400 index member stocks 
  Additions sample Deletions sample 
  EPS mean St. error EPS mean St. error 
pre-event period 1.37 (0.11) 2.20 (0.49) 
post-event period 1.45 (0.12) 2.06 (0.44) 
Δ(EPS)% 5.96% 
 
–6.54% 
 
equality of means t-statistic (–0.49)  (0.13) 
 
 
Note: Pre-event and post-event periods refer to one year before and one year after the event date for 
each firm, respectively. EPS mean measures the average earnings per share for each firm a year 
before and a year after the event (earnings are announced quarterly and are averaged over four 
calendar quarters). Standard Error of the EPS mean measures the standard deviation of the mean. 
T-statistic refers to the test of the equality of EPS means before and after the event. 
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Figure 1:  Estimation and observation windows  
Short-term observation window                            
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
            Long-term observation window                     Estimation window 
 
  
T-10    T   T+15  
  |       |       | 
                  T+125 
                      | 
                T+375 
                      | 
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Figure 2:  Long term trading volume performance after addition to the MSCI KLD 400 
index 
 
 
Figure 3:  Long term abnormal trading volume performance after deletion from the MSCI 
KLD 400 index 
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